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The appellant [Safeco] relies on several contentions stressing two
in particular. One, that the insurance companies are entitled to
fair consideration and should not be prejudiced because they are
insurance companies. As to this contention we find no merit and
will not discuss the same.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance is designed to protect the policyholder from some ca-
lamity. In an insurance contract, the policyholder expects prompt
action of the insurance company in protecting him from liability to
a third person or in indemnifying him for a personal loss. Refusal
of the company to act casts the insured adrift at a time when he
* The development of the tort of bad faith in insurance cases is in a state of evolution.
The research for this article was ended on October 15, 1980, and does not reflect changes in
the law subsequent to that date.
** Associate, Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones; B.S., Montana State Univer-
sity, 1972; J.D., University of Montana School of Law, 1975.
1. Justice John C. Harrison writing for the Montana Supreme Court in Atcheson v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 165 Mont. 239. 245. 527 P.2d 549. 552 (1974).
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particularly needs help. In the not too distant past, if the insured
could establish a breach by the company, the insured's damages
were determined by what the contract obligated the company to
do.' Recovery for the insured's anxiety or economic losses could
not, under traditional contract principles, be recovered.'
To protect the Montana public, the legislature enacted a com-
prehensive Insurance Code in 1959.4 According to its principal
draftsman, the Insurance Code was "designed as a strong, sharp,
and sufficiently versatile instrument for the protection of the Mon-
tana public interest in insurance, with special facilities for its ad-
ministration.' Included in the new law were provisions prohibiting
certain unfair trade practices,' including the acts of bad faith,
2. Wade v. Great Am. Ins., 255 F. Supp. 735, 736 (D. Mont. 1966).
3. Helton v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (D. Mont. 1975); RESTATE-
MENT oF CONTrACTS § 341 (1932).
4. 1959 Mont. Laws ch. 286, codified at MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited
as MCA] § 33-18-201 et seq. (1979).
5. Williams, Montana's Comprehensive New Insurance Law, 22 MONT. L. REV. 1, 10-
11 (1960).
6. See MCA tit. 33, ch. 18 (1979). The insurance commissioner was given broad powers
to investigate unfair trade practices and issue cease and desist orders. In 1977 these statutes
were amended to include additional provisions to protect an insured from oppressive tactics
of his company in the settlement of a claim, and to provide penalties payable to the state
treasury. See 1977 Mont. Laws ch. 320, §§ 1-9 now codified in MCA § 33-18-201 (1979),
which enumerate unfair claim settlement practices:
No person may, with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, do
any of the following:
(1) misrepresent pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating
to coverages at issue;
(2) fail to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communica-
tions with respect to claims arising under insurance policies;
(3) fail to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation of claims arising under insurance policies;
(4) refuse to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation
based upon all available information;
(5) fail to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
after proof of loss statements have been completed;
(6) neglect to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and eq-
uitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably
clear;
(7) compel insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the
amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds;
(8) attempt to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a rea-
sonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written
or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an
application;
(9) attempt to settle claims on the basis of an application which was
altered without notice to or knowledge or consent of the insured;
(10) make claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompa-
nied by statements setting forth the coverage under which the payments
2
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which the Montana court recently recognized as compensable.7
The legislation regulating the insurance industry did not, how-
ever, seem to remedy the problems encountered by an insured who
was denied insurance benefits. To compensate such an insured, the
judiciary in many states created the tort of "bad faith." By evoking
this new remedy, an insured could subject an insurer to liability
beyond the company's contractual limit. This permitted an insured
to recover extra-contractual compensatory damages, and, in some
cases, punitive damages, from his insurer for an alleged breach of
contract.
Initially, the tort of "bad faith" evolved to establish liability of
an insurer for its wrongful refusal to accept a reasonable settle-
ment offer proposed by a third party to compromise a claim
against its insured within policy limits. Thereafter, the tort of "bad
faith" grew to expose the insurer to liability for extra-contractual
damages in processing the claims of its own insured. The former
situation is generally referred to as a third party case, while the
latter situation is generally referred to as a first party case.
"Bad faith" is, quite simply, the insurer's failure to act in good
faith in considering the interests of an insured. Even though the
duty to act in good faith does not appear in the express provisions
of the insurance agreement, courts in some jurisdictions, most no-
tably California, have implied it as a matter of law in every insur-
ance contract. It is the violation of the implied covenant of good
faith which gives rise to the tort of "bad faith" and subjects the
insurer to liability beyond that for breach of contract. Addition-
ally, the insured may recover general damages, such as those for
mental distress.
are being made;
(11) make known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from
arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the
amount awarded in arbitration;
(12) delay the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an in-
sured, claimant, or physician of either to submit a preliminary claim re-
port and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of
loss forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the same
information;
(13) fail to promptly settle claims, if liability has become reasonably
clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to in-
fluence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy cover-
age; or
(14) fail to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in
the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial
of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
7. First Security Bank v. Goddard, -- Mont-., 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1979).
1981]
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Decisions in Montana have long recognized the duty of good
faith and fair dealing in third party actions.' Until recently, the
liability of an insurer in a first party situation for extra-contractual
damages has been held to arise not from the violation of any duty
to act in good faith, but rather from the failure of the insurer to
comply with the Insurance Code. However, a recent decision, First
Security Bank v. Goddard,10 suggests that Montana may also rec-
ognize a separate tort of bad faith in first party actions.
The purpose of this article is to provide a perspective on the
tort of "bad faith." Since California heralded this new claim for
relief, particular emphasis will be placed upon its decisions. Mon-
tana's unique approach to the problem will be explored in detail.
Lastly, the various approaches taken by other jurisdictions will be
outlined.
II. DEVELOPMENT-THE CALIFORNIA DECISIONS
A. Refusal to Reasonably Settle
The California Supreme Court first recognized the tort of "bad
faith" in Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co.11 In that case, the
court sanctioned a new claim for relief against an insurer who had
unreasonably refused to settle a claim against its insured within its
policy limits. Nothing in the express provisions of the insurance
contract required the insurer to pay if a demand fell at or under its
policy limits, but the court said such an obligation could arise
outside the contract from the insurer's implied-in-law duty to act
in good faith and deal fairly with its insured. Breach of this legal
duty was tantamount to bad faith, which the court concluded was
an actionable wrong involving "substantial culpability. 1 2 Failure
to act in good faith could subject the insurer to all damages flowing
from the breach, including judgments against the insured in excess
of the policy limits. 3
8. See Jessen v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962), aff'd sub nom., Nat'l
Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964); Fowler v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 153 Mont. 74, 79-80, 454 P.2d 76, 79 (1969).
9. State ex rel. Larson v. District Court, 149 Mont. 131, 136, 423 P.2d 598, 601 (1967).
10. -- Mont-, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
11. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
12. Id. at - 319 P.2d at 75.
13. Id. at -, 319 P.2d at 77. The court recognized that ordinarily the injured party
does not have the right to sue the insurer directly, but such standing was conferred in the
case when the trustee in bankruptcy assigned the insured's claim to the injured plaintiff.
The court decided not to judge the insurance company's conduct by a standard of reasona-
bleness, concluding, "Negligence alone is insufficient to render the insurer liable." Id. at __
319 P.2d at 74.
[Vol. 42
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The California court next expanded the duty to act in good
faith where the insurer wrongfully denied coverage and refused to
participate in the defense of the insured in Comunale v. Traders &
General Insurance Co." There a judgment against the insured was
obtained in excess of the policy limits after the third party plaintiff
offered to settle within the limits. On appeal, the insurer argued
that there should be no liability in excess of the policy limits be-
cause the company believed there was no coverage. The court rec-
ognized that the duty of good faith implied in Guarantee Insur-
ance arose from the company's right to control the litigation. In
Trader's General Insurance, the company did not have this con-
trol because it refused to litigate. But the court held that where a
company lacks control of the litigation because it wrongfully re-
fused to defend the insured, the company was not excused from its
duty to consider the insured's interest in settling the case. 5 The
court gave the insured the right to sue in either tort or contract.1'
Therefore, the relief sought extended to compensatory as well as
punitive damages.
The Comunale decision was reaffirmed in Johansen v. Califor-
nia State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau.17 In
that case, the insurer again denied coverage and refused to accept
a reasonable settlement offer. The insured was subjected to a judg-
ment in excess of the policy limits and a suit was brought against
the insurer for the excess judgment. The insurer argued against
any breach of duty where the company's refusal to settle stemmed
from a bona fide belief that the policy did not provide coverage.
But the court relied upon language of Comunale and held that an
insurer's "good faith" belief in noncoverage affords no defense to
liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to accept a reasonable
settlement offer.' 8 Thus, an insurer who chooses to deny coverage
14. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
15. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 201-02. The court recognized a separate basis from which
the duty of good faith arose. The obligation to act in good faith implied in every contract
stems not only from the right of the insurer to control the litigation, but also from its duty
in every case to give at least as much consideration to the insured's interest as it does its
own. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 201.
16. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 203.
17. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
18. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292. Failure to undertake the defense
of an insured has been held in Oregon to amount to only a breach of contract for which
there can be no recovery for mental distress. Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978). The court reasoned that in an action for the failure
to settle within the policy limits the insurer acts in a fiduciary capacity representing the
insured. Violation of that duty amounts to a tort. But where the insurer has not undertaken
the duty to represent the insured, it has not assumed a fiduciary duty which can be
breached. The insured's remedy therefore is for breach of contract.
1981]
5
Harman: Insurer’s Bad Faith
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
is strictly liable for the consequences, including a judgment against
its insured in excess of its policy limits.
The use of the deny-at-your-own-peril test articulated in
Comunale and Johansen is a far cry from the "substantial culpa-
bility" test imposed by Guarantee Insurance Co. The next case,
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 1' further eroded the standard
used to measure "bad faith" in third party situations.
In Crisci, the company had a policy limit of $10,000. The in-
sured's attorney advised the company that if the third party plain-
tiff could sustain its claim, a verdict exceeding $100,000 could be
rendered. The company refused to settle for $9,000 and judgment
against the insured was ultimately rendered for $101,000.20 In the
insured's action to recover the excess, the company argued that it
had acted in good faith in relying on its psychiatric experts to dis-
credit the third party plaintiff's testimony. The court in Crisci em-
ployed the following test to determine whether an insurer gave
consideration to the interest of the insured: "[Wihether a prudent
insurer without policy limits could have accepted the settlement
offer. '21 Thus, the negligence test so carefully avoided in Guaran-
tee Insurance Co. became the standard in Crisci by which the in-
surer's conduct was to be judged."
B. Refusal to Pay The Insured's Claims
1. Establishment of the First Party Rule
The third party cases set the stage for the second type of bad
faith claim where the company unreasonably withholds money due
under the policy. The earliest California decision to consider the
19. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
20. In Guarantee Insurance Co., the court presciently avoided this dilemma of putting
the insurer in a position where it had to act at its own peril in choosing which witnesses to
believe. See 155 Cal. App. 2d at -, 319 P.2d at 74.
21. 66 Cal. 2d at -, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
22. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18. The court considered an argument
by amicus curiae that a rule of strict liability should be applied against an insurer where a
judgment in excess of the policy limits is obtained. Although the court found favor with
such a rule because it would eliminate the determination of whether the offer was reason-
able, it avoided a decision on the subject by finding evidence that the insurer had acted
unreasonably. See Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for an Insurer's Failure to Settle: A
Balanced Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DuKE L.J. 901. There the author states
that the benefits of a strict liability approach include the protection of the insured against
economic injury as well as mental suffering where the insurer guesses wrong, and the elimi-
nation of potential conflicts of interest which any attorney is confronted with in the defense
of an insured. Although there will be additional insurance costs, there will also be some
savings inasmuch as costly litigation over excess liability coverage will be eliminated. Id. at
910.
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tort of bad faith in the context of first party actions was Fletcher
v. Western National Life Insurance Co.2" There the disability in-
surer falsely claimed that the insured had made a material misrep-
resentation and then attempted to coerce the insured into a settle-
ment favorable to the company. The insured suffered economic
hardship and emotional distress and sued under intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The court ruled that the insurer had
violated its implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing. In
discussing the duty owed, the court reaffirmed the company's gen-
eral duty not to deprive its insured of the benefits of the policy
2 4
Similarly, the court held that the general duty to accept reasonable
settlement offers imposed an additional obligation not to mali-
ciously threaten to withhold payments due under the policy for the
purpose of injuring the insured.26 Violation of this new duty
sounds in tort as well as in contract.2
The holding in Fletcher was further refined in Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co.27 In that case, the company denied coverage
under a fire policy because the insured failed to comply with the
policy's cooperation clause by refusing to submit to an oral exami-
nation. The court held that the same implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing imposed in third party actions applied in cases
where the company handled claims by the insured, and that this
included a duty not to withhold unreasonably payments due under
a policy.2 8 Aetna Insurance contended that the duty to act in good
faith was conditioned upon the insured's compliance with the ex-
press conditions of the policy. The court rejected this argument
holding that the duty to act in good faith is an obligation implied-
in-law which is not dependent upon the insured meeting the condi-
tions precedent of the insurance contract; rather, the duty is
"absolute., 29
2. Concurrent Coverage/Punitive Damages
The California Supreme Court examined first party actions for
23. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
24. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
28. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
29. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488. As the dissent pointed out, if an
insurer wants to avoid a bad faith lawsuit, it must pay all claims first and investigate after-
wards, assuming payment does not waive the right to investigate it. Id. at 592, 510 P.2d at
1049, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 497 (Roth, J., dissenting).
1981]
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bad faith again in Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co.30 There
the insured's policy provided $5,000 worth of medical pay coverage
but contained an exclusion for losses caused by injuries for which
compensation was payable under Workmen's Compensation. The
insurance company denied coverage on the basis of the exclusion,
and the workmen's compensation claim was settled two years after
the injury for $3,709. The supreme court found no merit in the
company's contentioh that it was entitled to wait until the conclu-
sion of the Workmen's Compensation proceeding before it paid or
denied the claim, a practice generally accepted in the insurance
field."1 The insurer's failure under the facts of the case to advance
payments for the very contingency insured against violated its
duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court held that the com-
pany should have paid the claim and then filed a lien against any
Workmen's Compensation recovery."'
The court granted a new trial on the issue of punitive dam-
ages, holding that the requisite intent to injure the insured did not
necessarily flow from a violation of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing." Therefore, merely because an insurance company vi-
olated its duty to act in good faith, it is not subjected to punitive
damages. Silberg established that there must be proof beyond that
required to establish bad faith of an intent to vex, injure, or annoy
to establish a right to claim punitive damages.34 However, the
court's affirmance of compensatory damages again suggests that an
erroneous denial of benefits, even accompanied by a good faith be-
lief that they are not owed, subjects an insurer to liability.
C. Extending First Party Claims to Third Party Claims
The California courts have adopted the same standard of care
in the first party actions which they had implied in third party
cases. Until 1978, no court had discussed why the tort was ex-
panded from third party to first party cases. In Austero v. Na-
30. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
31. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 462-63, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The court relied upon CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) which provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
Montana's counterpart to this statute is identical. See MCA § 27-1-221 (1979).
34. 11 Cal. 3d 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
[Vol. 42
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tional Casualty Co., "1 the court struggled to differentiate the du-
ties owed in each situation.
In Austero the disability insurer refused to pay benefits be-
cause it claimed the policy had lapsed prior to the onset of any
disability. The insured was an attorney who began to suffer loss of
memory in the fall of 1971, but continued routine court appear-
ances throughout 1972 and 1973. After the policy lapsed in 1973
for nonpayment of the premium, a claim was submitted in 1974.
The insurer denied coverage because the form filled out by the in-
sured's doctor contained "does not apply" responses to some of the
questions. The jury awarded $67,200 in compensatory damages,
which included an amount for benefits for the entire policy period
and an amount for mental distress, together with $336,000 in puni-
tive damages."'
The court reviewed the decisions on the subject of bad faith
and compared the duties owed by an insurer in third party situa-
tions with those in first party cases. The obligation to act in good
faith requires both parties to the insurance contract not to deprive
the other of the right to receive the benefits of the agreement."
Third party cases involve a situation where the policy requires the
insurance company to pay all sums for which the insured becomes
liable because of his own tortious conduct. In addition, the law im-
poses an obligation to accept reasonable offers by the third party
within policy limits as a part of its covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The test of whether the company has acted in good faith is
whether a prudent insurer operating without policy limits would
evaluate the case as unlikely to produce a judgment for less than
the offer.87 On the other hand, in first party cases, the company
agrees to pay money due under the policy upon the happening of
certain events. The benefit contracted for is the prompt payment
of money upon the occurrence of an event insured against.
The California court recognized that in first party situations
the insurer is not required to pay every claim presented to it for
such a practice would ultimately drive the insurer out of busi-
ness. 8 It has a duty to deal fairly with the insured as well as a
duty to its policyholders and other stockholders not to dissipate its
reserves by the payment of worthless claims. In Austero, the in-
34.1. 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978)
35. Id. at 5, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
36. Id. at 18, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
37. Id. at 28, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 671. Implicit in the denial of coverage is a refusal to
entertain reasonable settlement offers and subjects the insurer to liability under the deny-
at-your-own-risk rule of Comunale and Johansen.
38. Id. at 30, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
1981]
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sured's attorney argued that a test of strict liability should be
adopted in first party cases which would subject the insurer to lia-
bility should it ultimately be established that benefits were due
under the policy, the same approach followed in third party cases
in which coverage was denied.39 Since liability in third party denial
of coverage cases was ultimately based upon an unreasonable re-
fusal to settle and not upon strict liability, the court rejected the
insured's contention. 0 Instead, the court applied what it explained
had always been the rule in first party cases:
The substance or gravamen of the wrong in these first party cases
is an unreasonable refusal to pay benefits due under the terms of
the policies .... In evaluating the evidence to see if there was
any unreasonable conduct by the company, it is essential that no
hindsight test be applied.
4 1
Because there was no evidence to support a conclusion that the
insured acted in bad faith, there likewise was no evidence to sup-
port a finding of intent to injure the insured and therefore punitive
damages could not be awarded."
D. Application of the Reasonableness Test
Austero marks the first time an insurance company's conduct
was held to be reasonable. Following Austero the California court
decided Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange"4 and Egan v. Mu-
tual of Omaho," which reiterated the unreasonable conduct test
and rejected a strict liability rule. These cases illustrated the im-
precise nature of applying a test of reasonableness, and cast some
doubt upon whether the judiciary would heed Austero's mandate
and avoid a hindsight test.
The issue in Neal turned on whether the company should
have paid the policy's uninsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff
was a passenger in a car driven by her husband and suffered inju-
ries in a collision when her husband attempted a left turn in front
of an oncoming uninsured motorist. A legal opinion obtained by
the company concluded that the medical pay offset was unclear
and that "at best" the case on liability was "50-50.""4 The plaintiff
39. See generally Schwartz, Statutory Strict Liability for an Insurer's Failure to Set-
tle: A Balanced Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975 DuKz L.J. 901.
40. Id. at 30, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
41. Id. at 31-32, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 673 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 35, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
43. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
44. -Cal. 3d___, 598 P.2d 452 (1979).
45. 21 Cal. 3d at 919, 582 P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
[Vol. 42
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initiated arbitration proceedings, which resulted in an award of the
full $15,000 in uninsured motorist benefits."' The injured wife died
sometime after the accident from other causes and her estate then
sued on a theory of bad faith.
At the trial, special damages in the amount of $9,573.65 were
proven. The jury returned a verdict, with no differentiation be-
tween compensatory and punitive damages, in the amount of
$1,500,000.'7 The supreme court affirmed the judgment holding
that sufficient evidence existed to support the verdict, despite
proof that Farmers Insurance merely exercised its legal position
reasonably and in good faith. In a forceful dissent, Justice Clark
pointed out that the decision amounted to strict liability in first
party cases. Punishing the insurer for "guessing wrong" destroys
the statutory arbitration procedure, and also forces the insurer to
pay frivolous claims, Justice Clark concluded.4 '
In Neal, the court also limited the compensatory damages re-
coverable in a first party action to those proximately resulting
from the breach, such as economic loss or emotional distress. The
court said that since the plaintiff sustained her injuries prior to the
breach of the covenant of good faith, damages for those injuries
could not proximately result from the breach.4 9 Therefore, under
Neal, an insured cannot recover for pain and suffering or medical
expenses usually recoverable in a personal injury case.
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha0 involved a dispute over the pay-
ment of disability benefits. The insured submitted three claims
over a period of seven years for three separate back-related inju-
ries, culminating in a fourth claim for back injury in May of 1970.
The company then discovered evidence that fifty percent of plain-
tiff's current symptoms pertained to natural degenerative disease,
the rest to the industrial injury. Although the insured claimed he
was entitled to lifetime benefits, the company classified the injury
46. Id. at 919-20, 582 P.2d at 984, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
47. The verdict was later cut in half by remittitur. Id. at 920, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 394. The facts also disclosed that the insurer had gross assets of $765 million, net
assets of $211 million, and a net income of nearly $45 million.
48. Id. at 942, 582 P.2d at 999, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
49. Id. at 941, 582 P.2d at 999, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 408. Regarding the insurer's argument
that the punitive award was excessive, the court disagreed, holding that it amounted to less
than one week's worth of net income. Id. at 929, 582 P.2d at 991, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 400. In an
interesting footnote, the court condoned the award of punitive damages, reasoning that the
insurer who was punished deserved to lose business and would do so because the punitive
award would require it to raise its premiums to offset the award. Therefore, competing com-
panies would capitalize on that advantage and ultimately punish the recalcitrant insurer by
driving it out of business. Id. at 929 n.14, 582 P.2d at 991 n.14, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 400 n.14.
50. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
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a nonconforming illness and paid only three months benefits. At
trial, the insured recovered $45,600 in general damages and $78,000
for emotional distress together with $5,000,000 in punitive
damages. 1
The supreme court affirmed the compensatory award but re-
versed the punitive damage award on the grounds that it was ex-
cessive. In its opinion, the court relied heavily upon the fact that
the company failed to investigate the claim by personally contact-
ing the insured's treating physicians or by having the insured ex-
amined by an independent doctor of its choice.52
Justice Clark again dissented, pointing out that the cost of
punishing the insurance company for their settlement practices
will be passed on to the public in increased premiums.5 3 Contrary
to the rationale of the majority in the Neal case, Justice Clark
stated that the increased premiums are passed on to the general
public and not just to the policyholders of the guilty company, be-
cause insurance premiums are calculated on industry-wide losses,
not on the individual company losses.5 Therefore, the plaintiff
who obtains a large verdict for punitive damages in reality receives
a public subsidy to compensate him for his windfall. Justice Clark
concluded that the public should not be burdened with compensat-
ing the plaintiff who receives a punitive award, since it would be
sufficient detriment to permit the plaintiff to recover damages for
mental distress.55
According to Austero, Neal, and Egan, "bad faith" is unrea-
sonable conduct. But as these California cases suggest, the court's
definition of "bad faith" is certainly obscure and oversimplified.
51. Id. at 817, 598 P.2d at 455, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
52. Id. at 816, 598 P.2d at 454, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
53. Id. at 825, 598 P.2d at 460, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 490. In this connection Justice Clark
stated:
Others correctly criticize when the cost of punitive awards may be passed on to
the public, resulting in a public subsidy of plaintiff windfalls. Such result, obvi-
ously contrary to sound public policy (cf. Gov. Code, § 818 (no punitive damages
against a public entity)), is nonetheless risked when punitive damages are
awarded against an insurer for deficiencies, in its claims practice. The risk be-
comes a certainty for mutual insurance companies like Mutual. Because future
premiums are based largely on past loss experience and administrative expense in
the industry, such premiums can be expected to reflect punitive damages paid by
the industry. The public, then, is in the peculiar and indefensible position of pe-
nalizing itself with the payment going as unjust enrichment to someone for whom
the tort law, through the medium of compensatory damages, already fully
provides.
Id. at 826, 598 P.2d at 461, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 827 n.3, 598 P.2d at 462 n.3, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 492 n.3.
55. Id. at 827, 598 P.2d at 462, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
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Although the court adheres to the statement that the insurer's con-
duct should not be judged by any hindsight approach, it appears
from the facts of the cases that the court pays mere lip service to
such a rule. If the insurer's decision not to pay is erroneous, it ap-
pears that the insurer will be liable."
At least four principles pertaining to the tort of bad faith have
been established in California. First, an insurer's conduct is mea-
sured by a test of reasonableness in first and third party cases.
Second, whether an insurer acted reasonably should not be judged
by a hindsight test, but the size of the verdict permits an inference
in third party cases of the value of the claim and whether the in-
surer should have settled. Third, damages where the insurance
company has acted unreasonably include compensatory damages
proximately caused by the breach as well as punitive damages
where there is evidence of an intent to vex, injure, or oppress the
insured. And finally, damages for emotional distress are recover-
able without the requisite showing of severity.
III. THE MONTANA APPROACH
Although "good faith" was defined in an early Montana case,
the social need to apply it in insurance cases did not arise until
recently. In that early case, the court stated:
Although in its original and popular sense the term "in good
faith" denotes honesty of purpose, absence of bad faith, yet it is
popularly used to denote the actual existing state of the mind,
without regard to what it should be from given standards of law
and reason. It does not always require sound judgment and busi-
ness sagacity.
57
With respect to an insurer's liability, Montana courts do recognize,
at least in third party cases, that there is an implied-in-law duty
on the part of the company to act in good faith to protect the in-
terest of the insured. The development of the law of liability of an
insurer for refusal to pay in first party cases has not followed the
same vein as California, but a recent Montana case, First Security
Bank v. Goddard," indicates a willingness on the part of the Mon-
tana court to adopt the California approach.
56. As noted at notes 40-41 and accompanying text, Austero may be interpreted as
absolving an insurer who reasonably refuses to pay benefits. Austero, 84 Cal. App. 3d at
148 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
57. Tipton v. Sands, 103 Mont. 1, 17, 60 P.2d 662, 670 (1936).
58. -Mont.-, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
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A. Insurer's Refusal to Reasonably Settle
The rule subjecting an insurer to liability for its refusal to ac-
cept reasonable settlement offers originated in a Montana federal
district court decision. In Jessen v. O'Daniel,59 Judge Jameson
held that an attorney's failure to communicate settlement offers to
the insured was a violation of its obligation to act in good faith and
subjected the company to liability for a judgment in excess of the
policy limits.60 The court defined the company's duty as a fiduciary
obligation to use ordinary care to protect the insured's interest as
well as its own interest. 1
Failure to consider the insured's interest was bad faith and
rendered the company liable for its breach of the fiduciary obliga-
tion in an amount of the judgment over the policy limits.'2 Error in
judgment in not settling a case within the policy limits was not
itself sufficient to impose liability upon the company, nor was the
mere fact that the company was unsuccessful at the trial.'e The
court articulated standards by which the insurance company's con-
duct in considering the interests of the insured is to be judged:
At the outset, the court recognized the obligation on the part of
the insurer to exercise ordinary care and diligence in (a) investi-
gating an accident and interviewing witnesses; (b) giving due con-
sideration to applicable law; (c) making adequate preparation for
trial; (d) appraising and evaluating the case from a settlement
standpoint; and (e) negotiating for a settlement where a fair and
honest appraisal of the case requires such action."
Third party cases following Jessen all considered the objective
standards by which an insurer's conduct is to be judged and have
found a lack of sufficient evidence to find a violation of the in-
surer's obligation to act in good faith. 5 A review of these cases
59. 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962), affd sub noma., Nat'l Farmers Union Property &
Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1964).
60. Id. at 328.
61. Id. at 319.
62. Id. at 325.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 319.
65. Fetter Livestock Co. v. Nat'l Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 257 F. Supp. 4
(D. Mont. 1966). In Fetter the insurer was held not guilty of bad faith for refusing to accept
a $43,000 settlement offer, which was well within the $50,000 policy limits, where the evi-
dence revealed that able trial counsel, after a thorough investigation, evaluated the case as
being worth $17,000 to $20,000 for settlement purposes. In passing upon the conduct of trial
counsel for the insured the court said:
[They] were mistaken in their judgment with respect to what verdict might be
returned by the jury. They were also mistaken with respect to the applicable law.
Both courts and attorneys, however, may differ on the law applicable to a given
[Vol. 42
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reveals that the Montana Supreme Court will not lightly subject an
insurer to liability for a judgment in excess of the policy limits,
and will certainly not judge the insurer's conduct by a "twenty-
twenty hindsight vision" test." In the court's words, "That mis-
takes, omissions or misjudgments may have been made is appar-
ent; but these do not make bad faith.""e Thus, according to
Thompson, the insurer in third party cases is not judged by a
hindsight test, and the fact that the company's judgment was mis-
taken does not mean it was "wrongful." Instead, the court articu-
lated objective standards which provide a measure of
predictability.
B. Refusal to Pay the Insured
Montana has not yet applied the third party standard of rea-
sonableness in first party actions. Instead, an action by an insured
against his company for failure to pay insurance benefits subjects
the company to liability for damages in the amount of the benefits
owed, and if the insured can establish a violation of the Insurance
Code to which a criminal penalty attaches, he may then seek puni-
tive damages." The Montana Supreme Court has emphasized pun-
ishing an insurance company rather than compensating the insured
for his anxiety and economic loss suffered while he establishes his
state of facts. In retrospect it is clear that it would have been to the advantage of
both the insured and the insurer to have accepted the settlement demand of
$43,000. But neither the fact that [the insurer] and its counsel erred in their judg-
ment nor the fact that the defense of the action was unsuccessful is in itself suffi-
cient to impose liability upon [the insurer] for recovery in excess of the policy
limits.
Id. at 13.
In Fowler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 153 Mont. 74, 82, 454 P.2d 76, 80 (1969),
the third party offered to settle for $7,500, policy limits were $10,000, and judgment was
ultimately rendered for $20,126.80. The court analyzed the case under the objective stan-
dard set forth in Fetter and held there was no evidence of bad faith or negligence on the
part of the insurer and reversed the judgment of the district court. In Thompson v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 161 Mont. 207, 217, 505 P.2d 423, 429 (1973), the court concluded
that the insurer did not act negligently or in bad faith by refusing a $9,500 offer of settle-
ment where the limits were $10,000 and an excess judgment was rendered.
66. Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 161 Mont. 207, 219, 505 P.2d 423,
429 (1973).
67. Id. In Thompson the court implicitly approved an instruction to the jury that bad
faith was a "willful failure to respond to a plain and well-understood obligation," yet the
court in the same breath stated that negligence and bad faith were synonomous. Id. at 219,
505 P.2d at 430. "Willful" connotes an intentional omission on the part of the insurer, which
requires a greater burden of proof than a negligent failure to act, which is a failure to exer-
cise the same degree of care as a reasonably prudent insurer would have exercised. The
definition of "bad faith" as a "willful" failure to act is akin to the definition of "substantial
culpability" found in Guarantee Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d at -, 319 P.2d at 77.
68. State ex rel. Larson v. District Court, 149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967).
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right to insurance benefits. In order to understand Montana's
treatment of the first party case, it is helpful to review the devel-
opment of the independent cause of action giving the insured a
right to sue his company to obtain punitive damages.
Punitive damages are governed by MCA § 27-1-221 (1979):
In any action for a breach of an obligation not arising from con-
tract where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual
damags may give damages for the sake of example and by way of
punishing the defendant.
Analysis of this statute begins with the phrase "arising from con-
tract," for if an insured's claim for relief arises from the insurance
contract, punitive damages cannot be recovered.
1. Arising from Contract
In Westfall v. Motors Insurance Corp.,69 the supreme court
reversed a jury award of punitive damages against Motors Insur-
ance, finding that the claim arose out of a breach of contract. Rely-
ing upon California authority, the court stated the general rule
that "an award of punitive damages may not be granted in an ac-
tion based on breach of contract even though defendant's breach
was willful or fraudulent."70 Westfall was affirmed in several deci-
sions. 1 In one such case, ' Judge Russell Smith struck from the
complaint a demand for punitive damages where defendant alleg-
edly acted unreasonably and in bad faith by refusing to pay insur-
ance benefits after plaintiff submitted a proof of loss under a prop-
erty policy. The court reasoned that willful or fraudulent breaches
of the contract did not justify an award of punitive damages.7
3
In Ryan v. Ald, Inc.,7 plaintiff claimed that defendant falsely
promised that washing machines would be properly installed in
good working condition in his new laundromat. Plaintiff alleged
that these promises induced him to sign a contract to purchase the
equipment. The jury returned a verdict with an award in plaintiff's
favor, including $7,500 punitive damages. On appeal, the court re-
69. 140 Mont. 564, 374 P.2d 96 (1962).
70. Id. at 570, 374 P.2d at 99, citing Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 398, 303 P.2d 1029,
1033 (1958).
71. Wade v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 255 F. Supp. 735, 736 (D. Mont. 1966); State ex rel.
Cashen v. District Court, 157 Mont. 40, 44, 482 P.2d 567, 570 (1971); Ryan v. Aid, Inc., 146
Mont. 299, 302-03, 406 P.2d 373, 375 (1965).
72. Wade v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 255 F. Supp. 735, 736 (D. Mont. 1966).
73. Id.
74. 146 Mont. 299, 406 P.2d 373 (1965).
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versed and remanded the case for a new trial. Punitive damages
were not recoverable in a case of this kind, the court said, since a
fraudulent inducement constitutes an action for breach of an obli-
gation arising from contract. Again the court relied upon
Westfall.
7 56
2. A Statutory Action
A significant exception to the Westfall rule prohibiting puni-
tive damages in cases involving an insurance contract was devel-
oped in State ex rel. Larson v. District Court.76 In that case the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant, a disability insurer, had re-
fused to pay benefits in violation of a Montana statute7 which re-
quired that disability benefits be paid immediately upon receipt of
due proof of loss. The defendant argued that plaintiff's claim for
relief arose from the insurance contract and thus punitive damages
were barred under Westfall. The court distinguished Westfall, rea-
soning as follows:
Making reference to the Westfall case, supra, and to [MCA § 27-
1-221 (1979)], [defendant] takes the position that exemplary
damages are not proper in any action arising out of a contract
obligation. We note, however, that [MCA § 27-1-202 (1979)] pro-
vides that every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful
act or admission of another may recover from the person in fault
a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages.
Therefore, if a party can state a claim which brings him under the
provisions of [MCA § 27-1-202 (1979)] he can also come within
the provisions of [MCA § 27-1-221 (1979)] and attempt to collect
exemplary damages.
In the instant case petitioner . . .contends that it was a
breach of a contract obligation owed to him, and second . . that
it was a violation of the insurance laws of Montana .... Thus,
the second contention ... distinguishes the instant [case] ...
from the Westfall case, supra.
7
8
75. Ryan, 146 Mont. at 302-03, 406 P.2d at 375.
76. 149 Mont. 131, 423 P.2d 598 (1967).
77. MCA § 33-22-211 (1979).
78. Larson, 149 Mont. at 134-35, 423 P.2d at 600. In Larson, the plaintiff contended
that the insurer had violated R.C.M. 1947, § 40-4011 (MCA § 33-22-211 (1979)) which pro-
vides as follows:
There shall be a provision as follows: "Time of payment of claims: indemnities
payable under this policy for any loss other than loss for which this policy pro-
vides any periodic payment will be paid immediately upon receipt of due written
proof of such loss. ...
In citing the statute involved, the court ignored the introductory language
"there shall be a provision as follows." The facts of the case do not disclose
1981]
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In granting a plaintiff a private cause of action under the In-
surance Code, the court effectively created a new cause of action.
The argument that the Insurance Code provided remedies exclu-
sively to the insurance commissioner against insurance companies
guilty of unfair practices with respect to their insureds was appar-
ently never raised. In State ex rel. Cashen v. District Court,7 9 the
Montana Supreme Court emphasized the limited nature of Larson
by striking a count for punitive damages from an insured's com-
plaint where the statutes alleged to have been violated did not ap-
ply to the case. The court left standing the count for breach of
contract.
3. Mental Distress
Since the sufficiency of the pleadings were at issue in both the
Larson and Cashen decisions, neither case considered the type of
compensatory damages recoverable for a violation of the Insurance
Code. Economic loss as well as emotional distress are the most nat-
ural injuries to flow from a denial of insurance benefits. Under
Montana law, it is unclear whether a claim for emotional distress
arising from the denial of insurance benefits is compensable.
In a case decided prior to Larson, Judge Russell Smith re-
served ruling on the sufficiency of the bare allegations that the in-
sured parties were entitled to damages for mental distress when
the insurance adjuster maliciously accused them of lying and
fraud.80 Nearly a decade later, the same court concluded that an
insured could not recover for the anxiety she suffered where the
complaint alleged the insurance company was guilty of nothing
more than deliberate stalling and an ultimate refusal to pay disa-
bility benefits.8 '
The Montana legislature did not sit idly by while all of this
judicial regulation of insurance companies was taking place. By
1977 the law of bad faith had been well established in first party
actions in California, and Larson was nearly ten years old. During
the 1977 session the legislature supplemented the Insurance Code
with new laws designed to protect the insured from potential un-
whether the policy had such a clause as required by the statute. Assuming the
policy contained that provision, then Larson can be broadly interpreted to mean
that an insurance company commits an unlawful act within the meaning of the
general recovery statute not only by failing to include a provision in its policy
required by the Insurance Code, but also by refusing to honor that provision once
it has been included. Such a result is incongruous.
79. 157 Mont. 40, 47, 482 P.2d 567, 571 (1971).
80. Wade v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 255 F. Supp. 735, 736 (D. Mont. 1966).
81. Helton v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 399 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (D. Mont. 1975).
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fair settlement practices of the insurer.82 MCA § 33-18-201 (1979)
contained fourteen subsections which proscribed as unfair prac-
tices, among other things, the failure to adequately investigate a
claim and failure to attempt in good faith to effect a prompt, fair,
and equitable settlement in which liability has become reasonably
clear.83 Furthermore, a more stringent penalty provision was en-
acted which subjected an insurer guilty of an unfair business prac-
tice to a maximum fine of $10,000, payable to the state treasury.84
Presumably, under the Larson doctrine, an insured, aggrieved by
conduct of his insurer amounting to an unfair business practice,
may also maintain a private action for violation of MCA § 33-18-
201 (1979) and seek punitive damages. One wonders if the legisla-
ture intended this result, especially since the penalty provision
mentions neither a private right of action nor punitive damages.
California has held that such a right exists.88
C. Goddard and the Tort of Bad Faith
In First Security Bank v. Goddard,"' the Montana Supreme
Court reviewed for the first time a verdict in a first party action.
Although liability in the case was premised upon the statutory vio-
lation of the insurer to promptly pay credit disability benefits, the
court referred unwittingly to general principles of the tort of bad
faith.
The facts were critical to the court's decision and the standard
by which an insurer's conduct is to be judged. On October 4 or 5,
1975, John Goddard executed a note, security agreement, and ap-
plication for credit life and disability insurance in connection with
the purchase of an automobile and mailed the instruments to the
creditor, First Security Bank of Bozeman. The bank received the
82. See 1977 Mont. Laws ch. 320, §§ 1-9, codified at MCA §§ 33-18-101, -201, -210, -
1001, -1002, -1004, and -1005 (1979).
83. MCA § 33-18-202 (1979).
84. MCA § 33-18-1005 (1979).
85. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 336, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 849 (1979). The court recognized an independent cause of action on behalf of an
injured third person to sue a tortfeasor's insurance company directly where the complaint
alleged that the insurer violated a section of the Insurance Code relating to unfair trade
practices. In the case, an injured person sued both the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's in-
surer, alleging a violation of CAL. Civ. CODO § 790.03 (West 1970). That section provided
that it is an unfair and deceptive practice on the part of an insurance company to act know-
ingly or with such frequency as to establish a business practice which fails to effectuate a
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of the claim where liability has become reasonably
clear. Understandably, this case caused much consternation in the insurance community
since most people believed that the Insurance Code was intended to provide remedies for
the Insurance Comission to use against insurance companies vis-a-vis their insureds.
86. -- Mont.-, 593 P.2d 1040 (1979).
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documents on October 7, 1975. Goddard became ill on October 5
and consulted a physician two days later who diagnosed coronary
illness and concluded that Goddard's disability began October 5.
Goddard made no payments under the note and demanded that
the insurer, Bankers Union Life, make such payments. Bankers
Union Life refused to make any payments to First Security Bank,
relying upon a clause in the policy which excluded disability bene-
fits if the disability resulted from a pre-existing illness.
The district court awarded the bank the amount of the defi-
ciency judgment on Goddard's vehicle and entered judgment for
Goddard against Bankers Union Life for the deficiency amount
due, plus attorney's fees and a $5,000 punitive award. 7 On appeal,
Bankers Union argued that it was entitled to rely upon the exclu-
sion in its policy. In support of its argument, the bank maintained
that the insurance was not effective until October 7, 1975, when
the bank received the note and application, two days after God-
dard's disability commenced. The supreme court disagreed, hold-
ing that the intent of the credit life and disability insurance stat-
utes was to make the insurance effective when the indebtedness
was incurred. 8 Relying upon authority from other states, the court
held that the indebtedness was incurred when Goddard deposited
the instruments in the mail, on October 4 or 5, prior to his
disability.
With liability firmly established, the court analyzed whether
the compensatory and punitive awards were supported by the evi-
dence. Bankers Union contended that since the action sounded in
contract Goddard was only entitled to damages for the payments
due for the seven months he was disabled. The court rejected this
argument holding that the action sounded in tort.89 The proper
measure of damages were "for all the detriment proximately
caused by the wrongful act whether it could be anticipated or
not."90 The court held that the "wrongful act" of Bankers Union
was the breach of its statutory duty to pay in accordance with the
insurance contract.
The court also approved the "legal trend" of punishing an in-
surer who "willfully" refused to pay a valid claim.' 1 Breach of the
implied-in-law duty to act in good faith provided a separate basis
upon which the court concluded that the conduct of Bankers
87. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1042.
88. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1045.
89. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1046.
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Union was "wrongful. ' 92 The court held that the denial of the
claim resulted not from the fact that the disability began on Octo-
ber 5, but from the company's "incorrect" decision that coverage
commenced on October 7.93
The Goddard decision marks the first time the Montana court
implied the obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the context
of a first party case. The discussion of bad faith was extraneous
since the court confirmed the existence of the insurer's liability on
the basis that it violated the Insurance Code. The references to
"bad faith" either display a misconception of the tort itself or pre-
sent the most liberal application of the principles of bad faith yet
to be pronounced. Although Montana law recognized that an un-
reasonable refusal to pay insurance benefits due under a policy
constitutes bad faith and no hindsight test is to be used,94 the
court held that the insurer's denial of benefits, under circum-
stances in which the law governing its conduct was unclear, consti-
tuted bad faith. 5 There was no evidence that the company refused
to investigate the claim, refused to communicate with the insured,
or used oppressive tactics designed to force the insured into a dis-
advantageous settlement." The insurance company was evidently
guilty of nothing more than being wrong. Punishing an insurer for
mistaken judgment is tantamount to applying a hindsight test, a
test previously rejected by the court. One wonders how an insurer
can assess a claim, knowing that if its decision is "erroneous" it
will be subject to liability for extra-contractual damages.
D. Goddard and Punitive Damages
In affirming the award of punitive damages, the Goddard
court relaxed significantly the proof necessary to establish a right
92. Id. Bankers Union also contended that the award of punitive damages was unwar-
ranted, arguing that there was no criminal penalty directly provided for its failure to pay
credit disability benefits, and that there was no proof that its conduct was sufficiently mali-
cious, wanton, or oppressive to support the award. The court rejected both contentions.
First, the court held that a general criminal penalty applied to the failure to pay credit
disability benefits. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1048. Next, the court found that the evidence
supported a conclusion that Bankers Union acted with malice. Relying upon established
precedent, the court ruled that malice may be implied from the act of "engaging in a course
of conduct knowing it to be harmful and unlawful." Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1048-49.
93. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1049 (emphasis added).
94. See Fetter Livestock Co. v. Nat'l Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 257 F. Supp.
4, 13 (D. Mont. 1966); Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 161 Mont. 207, 217, 505
P.2d 423, 429 (1973); Fowler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 153 Mont. 74, 81-82, 454
P.2d 76, 79-80 (1969), discussed supra, note 64.
95. Goddard, -- Mont-, 593 P.2d at 1047.
96. See Fletcher v. W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970),
and discussion accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
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to such relief. Established precedent required proof of malice be-
yond proof of mere negligence97 before punitive damages would be
awarded.9 8 The Montana court earlier defined "malice" as a "wish
to vex, annoy or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrong-
ful act; malice could be either actual or presumed from all material
facts." Stated another way, the plaintiff was not entitled to puni-
tive damages as a matter of right unless something more than mere
negligence was alleged and proved.
In Goddard, the court relied upon several earlier decisions in
which implied malice had been discussed, to support the award of.
punitive damages. 100 In its broadest sense, the Goddard decision
holds that malice will be implied from a statutory violation. In all
of the cases upon which the court relied, knowledge on the part of
the company that it was doing something harmful to the plaintiff,
or evidence of reckless conduct or gross negligence was necessary
before the court would give the issue of punitive damages to the
jury. Yet, in Goddard, the court concluded that since the company
violated a law, a legal determination which was not reached until
the court issued its opinion, the insured was entitled to punitive
damages. Would the same rule apply where a motorist runs a stop
sign and collides with another motorist? Certainly the violation of
traffic regulations are "unjustifiable," according to the present
court.
What the Montana Supreme Court will decide next concerning
the tort of bad faith is uncertain, but from the tenor of the God-
dard decision it appears the court might deviate from its rather
conservative and objective approach followed in third party cases,
and expand an insurer's liability in the first party actions. The
question seems to be not whether the insurance company acted
97. Ferguson v. Town Pump, -- Mont-, 580 P.2d 915, 921 (1978).
98. MCA § 27-1-221 (1979).
99. Cashin v. N. Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 111, 28 P.2d 862, 869 (1934).
100. In the first case cited by the Goddard court, Ferguson v. Town Pump,
-Mont.-_, 580 P.2d 915 (1978), the plaintiffs contended that Town Pump knew of a leak
into their water wells. Because the court found no evidence that Town Pump knowingly
dumped gasoline into the ground, it held that punitive damages could not be awarded. Id. at
-, 580 P.2d at 921. In the second case, Miller v. Fox, -Mont.-, 571 P.2d 804, 808
(1977), the court held there was a sufficient basis for punitive damages based upon a finding
that defendant knew when the attachment of property was made that it was wrongful. In
Cashin v. N. Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 111-12, 28 P.2d 862, 869-70 (1934), the court held that
an award of punitive damages was proper where the evidence disclosed the defendant rail-
way, knowing it had caused prior damage, conducted blasting operations near the plaintiff's
home causing injury to plaintiffs. "Unjustifiable" conduct was found in the last case cited by
the court, Cherry-Burell Co. v. Thatcher, 107 F.2d 65, 69 (9th Cir. 1939), from proof that
plaintiff was injured when the car in which he was riding was struck by defendant's car
which was oncoming and attempting to pass another vehicle in a severe snowstorm.
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reasonably, but whether it acted correctly. Such a standard departs
from one of negligence and approaches strict liability.' 0'
IV. OTHER STATES
The law pertaining to the tort of bad faith in refusal to settle
in third party cases is well developed and need not be treated fur-
ther here.102 However, recent first party cases from other jurisdic-
tions deserve some comment. In Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire
Insurance Co.,' 5 the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to
recognize the independent tort of bad faith in a first party case.
Although New Hampshire decisions had allowed third party ac-
tions in the past, the court reasoned there was no basis to extend
the duty recognized in those cases to first party actions. The policy
behind third party cases-that the insurer has assumed by con-
tract control over the defense and settlement of claims and is
thereby required to exercise good faith to prevent the insured from
a judgment in excess of the policy limits-was held inapplicable in
first party claims. The court ruled that no basis existed to extend
the duty recognized in third party cases to first party claims, and
found as insufficient to state a claim for relief allegations that an
insurer wrongfully refused to settle a claim with its own insured.o
4
Significant to the court's determination was its recognition of stat-
utes which protected an insured from unfair trade practices in the
settlement of claims.'
5
In A.A.A. Pool Services & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,' os the Rhode Island Supreme Court likewise deferred
to its legislature the determination of whether an insured should
101. On Friday, June 27, 1980, plaintiffs Dr. and Mrs. Richard Weber recovered a
punitive damage award in a Great Falls district court of $999,000.00 from Blue Cross of
Montana on the grounds that Blue Cross had wrongfully refused to pay plaintiffs' medical
claims. Blue Cross had defended on the basis of misrepresentations of the family medical
records and that the claims arose out of preexisting conditions. Great Falls Tribune, June
28, 1980, at 1, col. 2. This case is currently on appeal to the Montana Supreme Court.
102. See Annotated Bibliography in 1973 Defense Research Institute Monograph In-
surance Law-Excessive Liability No. 3 (September 1973) which lists sixty-three law review
articles on the subject. For a more recent compendium of cases see Note, The Widening
Scope of Insurer's Liability, 63 Ky. L.J. 145 (1975). In Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters,
-- Mont.-, 609 P.2d 257 (1980), the supreme court recognized for the first time that an
injured worker could state a claim against his employer's insurer directly for alleged bad
faith handling of the claim. This case marks the first time that an injured person was per-
mitted to maintain an action directly against another's insurer. See also Vigue v. Evans
Products Co., -- Mont.-, 608 P.2d 488 (1980).
103. 118 N.H. 607, 614, 392 A.2d 576, 581 (1978).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 615, 392 A.2d at 581.
106. -R.I.-, 395 A.2d 724, 726 (1978).
19811
23
Harman: Insurer’s Bad Faith
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1981
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
be permitted to maintain an independent action for a bad faith
rejection of the insured's claim. The court was not persuaded by
insured's argument that the policy of insurance was one of adhe-
sion, reasoning that the policy was a standard one, the provisions
of which were prescribed by the legislature. The court has since
refused to change its position regarding first party claims in a case
in which the complaint alleged a bad faith refusal to pay under a
homeowner's policy.10°
Deference to legislation was again apparent in the case of De-
bolt v. Mutual of Omaha.108 There the Illinois Appellate Court
stated that an insured who alleged that his insurance payments
were delayed, that he was frustrated from obtaining payments, and
that he feared for his life, had sufficient remedy for breach of con-
tract and for violation of a statute which provided relief to an in-
sured who was the victim of a vexatious refusal to pay. The court's
conservative nature is apparent from this comment:
[W]e do not deem the making of law by judicial decree to be a
desirable practice per se but should be limited to instances when
humanitarian needs dictate the necessity of judicial action or
when legislative bodies for an unreasonably long time refuse to
enact statutes for the purpose of coping with an enduring
problem.10'
New York took the same conservative approach in Cosmopolitan
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Nassau Insurance Co.,110 the court hold-
ing that statutes prohibiting unfair trade practices obviate the
need for maintenance of private actions for punitive damages
against an insurer engaged in unfair trade practices.
The court in Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co.,"' concluded that the damages incurred by the insured whose
insurer refused to represent them and denied coverage were lim-
ited to damages traditionally recoverable in a contract action. The
Oregon court cited legislation similar to that in Montana which
provided a civil penalty to the state treasury where an insurer re-
fused to promptly settle claims "in which liability had become rea-
sonably clear," and concluded that had the legislature intended to
enlarge the damages to include compensation for mental distress
and punitive damages, it would have so provided.1 12 Since it did
107. Dilorio v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., -- R.I.-, 402 A.2d 745, 749 (1979).
108. 56 Ill. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373, 376 (1978).
109. Id. at 17, 371 N.E.2d at 78.
110. 417 N.Y.S.2d 835, 835-36 (1979).
111. 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978).
112. Id. at 458, 587 P.2d at 1018.
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not, those damages could not be recovered.
On the other hand, many jurisdictions followed the California
lead and recognized bad faith as an independent tort.113 For exam-
ple, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently recognized that the an-
cillary duty on the part of an insurance company to act in good
faith in the settlement of third party claims applies equally when
the insurance company is handling a personal claim of the in-
sured. " 4 The elements necessary to establish a claim for bad faith,
expressed by the court, leave a doubt as to the nature of the tort.
First, the insured must prove that there was not a reasonable basis
upon which to deny benefits; second, the insured must prove that
the company knew or acted with reckless disregard of this lack of a
reasonable basis for denying the claim.1 The test is objective:
whether a reasonable insurer under the circumstances would have
denied or delayed payment of the claim. The negligence standard
is the test of the insurer's conduct, yet the court refers to "bad
faith" as an intentional tort, which by definition it cannot be." 6
V. CONCLUSION
While California courts have created a new tort of bad faith in
first party actions, recent decisions from that jurisdiction evidence
the difficulty the judiciary is having in articulating the exact na-
ture of the duty owed by the insurer. Although the insurer's con-
duct is to be judged under a negligence standard as to what a rea-
sonable insurer would have done, the results obtained indicate the
113. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972); Robertson v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 464 F. Supp. 876, 883 (D. S.C. 1979); Escambia Treating
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367, 1370-71 (N.D. Fla. 1976); United Services
Auto Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska 1974); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
McNeil, 556 P.2d 803, 809 (Ariz. App. 1976)(dictum); Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance
Co., 203 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Iowa 1972); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Peter-
son, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (Nev. 1974); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 646 (N.D. 1979); Chavez v. Chenoweth, 553 P.2d 703, 709 (N.M.
App. 1976); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fraiman, 588 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
Cf., applying statutes, Key Life Ins. Co. of South Carolina v. Mitchell, 129 Ga. App. 192,
195, 198 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1973); Matthews v. Travelers Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 292, 300, 510 P.2d
1315, 1321 (1973); Graham v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 988, 994-95 (La. App.
1979); Citizens Discount & Inv. Corp. v. Dixon, 499 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. App. 1973). See
generally Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 314 (1973).
114. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
115. Id. at 693, 271 N.W.2d at 377.
116. Id. at 691, 271 N.W. 2d at 376. As to damages, the court said that absent proof of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the insured must prove substantial damages
apart from the emotional distress itself and the damages occasioned by simple breach of
contract. Id. at 695-96, 271 N.W.2d at 378. Punitive damages required proof of an intent to
injure, vex, or annoy. Silberg, 11 Cal. 3d at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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courts may pay mere lip service to such a rule, and equate an in-
surer's mistaken judgment with a bad faith refusal to pay.
Montana had developed strict objective standards in third
party cases against which an insurer's conduct is to be judged. Yet,
in Goddard, the Montana Supreme Court ignored those standards
and adopted what may be a strict liability approach. Furthermore,
the court relaxed the quantum of proof in a bad faith case required
to establish a basis for punitive damages. Such an approach is dan-
gerous and evinces the risks of making law through common law
development. Goddard does more to confuse the Montana position
than it does to explain it. The Montana Supreme Court has failed
to articulate standards which provide necessary predictability in
this area. Legislation in the form of the Insurance Code has appar-
ently not accomplished its purpose in protecting the public, yet
there is no discussion of any such failure in the decisions. Further-
more, it seems unfair that the burden of spectacular compensatory
and punitive awards is paradoxically borne by the public in the
form of increased premiums. The ancillary effect of such awards is
to coerce insurance companies to pay dubious claims which in turn
are paid by others in increased premiums. As one executive of a
large insurance company stated: "People with unquestionable
claims, and that [is] about ninety-five percent, are not bene-
fited." ' 17 It is difficult to justify a substantial windfall to an in-
sured when the cost is passed on to the public.
The future development of the tort of bad faith should be ap-
proached cautiously with the rights of both the insured and insurer
in balance, in order that the tort will not expand in an obscure
fashion, but will be articulated clearly and equitably.
117. TIME, September 10, 1979, at 47.
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